

28 October 1970

414

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Contacts with Chilean
Military [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
29 September 1970

Requests COS call in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to
"work closely with [REDACTED] Chief . . . in contacting and advising
the principal military figures who might play a decisive role
in any move which might deny the presidency to Allende." [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
30 September 1970

Following three officers key figures in military planning:

1. [REDACTED]
2. General VALENZUELA
3. [REDACTED]

Requests Station make it clear to these officers indivi-
dually that USG views military solution only answer; that they
to be assured USG will provide support and pledges they demand.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
5 October 1970

[REDACTED] briefed on above by COS [REDACTED] October. Objective to
condition high-level military contacts to start working toward
military solution with necessary assurances that they can pro-
ceed with full moral backing by USG and, within reason, can
depend on our material support once they decide to move.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
SECRET [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

335

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
5 October 1970

[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] October with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] surprised he chosen for approach, admitted contacts with Air Force, Navy and [REDACTED], but stated had only small organization which could not move until they felt they could win. [REDACTED]

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
6 October 1970

[REDACTED] reported he informed by [REDACTED] that General VIAUX had told [REDACTED] October of his readiness to launch golpe evening 9 October. VIAUX asked [REDACTED] for paralyzing gas grenades which [REDACTED] requested from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

8 October 1970

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
9 October 1970

[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] who claimed talked to VIAUX previous evening. VIAUX and people not ready to move and [REDACTED] convinced he has no people. [REDACTED] has told his principals [REDACTED] that he sees no chance of anything happening which will deny Allende the presidency
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SECRET

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
8 October 1970

[REDACTED] called [REDACTED] October by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] said officers at school had been meeting for some time and
had been working with unnamed high-ranking member of govern-
ment to try to exert force on Frei to eliminate General
Schneider peacefully or otherwise. [REDACTED] wanted [REDACTED]
to ask [REDACTED] to see if could invite Schneider to
[REDACTED] Also asked [REDACTED] if USG would help with several
hundred small automatic weapons if needed.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
14 October 1970

[REDACTED] had long discussion [REDACTED] October with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and gave him party line similar
to that previously given to VALENZUELA, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] does not feel golpe is correct solution to problem and
Army must wait and be prepared to take action only when Allende
does something unconstitutional.

[REDACTED]
14 October 1970

Asks Station to deliver Eyes Only message from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to [REDACTED] Choose two general officers who can
best be trusted and most likely respond, to convey to these
officers that high authority in Washington has authorized you
to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean
armed forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent
election of Allende on 24 October.

[REDACTED]

SECRET [REDACTED]

██████████ Headquarters requests Station use whatever channel available dissuade VIAUX from precipitate coup but offer him full support for move at proper time.

Re [REDACTED] will attempt contact General Camilo VALENZUELA to brief and also ask him to caution VIAUX about precipitate move.

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SANTIAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] pass following message to [REDACTED] "If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
16 October 1970

COS has directed [REDACTED] not to expand circle of senior officers to be made knowledgeable of USG position.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
16 October 1970

[REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] October that meeting between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to persuade SCHNEIDER to change his position re Army intervention turned out to be fiasco. [REDACTED] reminded [REDACTED] that USG stands ready to help with anything plotting elements may need.

[REDACTED]

SECRET [REDACTED]

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
16 October 1970

[REDACTED] summoned [REDACTED] October by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that since last meeting [REDACTED] he had
established numerous unnamed contacts with military personnel
and VIAUX people. Plan exists involving kidnapping of "various
important people." Need arms and need money to procure same.

[REDACTED]
Station does not rule out possibility [REDACTED] fronting for
VIAUX.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
18 October 1970

[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 17 October. Asked that
by evening 18 October [REDACTED] furnish eight to ten tear gas
grenades. And that within 48 hours, they need three 45
caliber sub-machine guns with 500 rounds ammunition each.

Station plans give six tear gas grenades to [REDACTED] for
delivery to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
19 October 1970

[REDACTED] brought [REDACTED] together with [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED] 18 October. [REDACTED] discreetly withdrew when [REDACTED]
pointedly stated "this Chilean matter."

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
19 October 1970

[REDACTED] picked up [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] where [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] waiting.
turned over two packages (tear gas and masks to [REDACTED]).

[REDACTED] returned [REDACTED] General VALENZUELA called to say
he would visit later that evening. VALENZUELA reminded [REDACTED]
of last talk and stated he now ready to act. On 19 October
will invite SCHNEIDER to stag party and kidnap him and take
him to Argentina. Named principals. Said VIAUX knowledgeable
of operation but not personally involved. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SECRET [REDACTED]

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
20 October 1970

VALENZUELA visited [REDACTED] 20 October [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] VALENZUELA denied [REDACTED] in any way
involved in op.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
20 October 1970

[REDACTED] View increasing risks keeping [REDACTED]
involved, Station intends withdraw him from further [REDACTED]
participation by 24 October.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
20 October 1970

[REDACTED]
sent by [REDACTED] to visit [REDACTED] 20 October to explain why
19 October abduction attempt aborted. Said SCHNEIDER's car
too fast and outran pursuers.

Confirmed [REDACTED] in charge of operation.

Mentioned that [REDACTED] would see [REDACTED] evening [REDACTED]
October to pick up certain items promised him (Station will
deliver SMG's to [REDACTED].)

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
22 October 1970

General SCHNEIDER machine gunned on way to work a.m.
22 October.

SANTIAGO [REDACTED]
22 October 1970

---SMG's delivered to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] 1400 hours,
21 October.

(APPARENTLY NEITHER VALENZUELA NOR [REDACTED] HAS HAD FURTHER
CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] AS OF 27 OCTOBER, NOR HAS [REDACTED] MADE ANY
OTHER CONTACTS ON BEHALF OF THE STATION.)

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Station Feelers & Contacts with Viaux Group

6 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

Participants: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was informed by [REDACTED] that General Roberto VIAUX told him following on evening 6 Oct: (a) Viaux ready to launch golpe evening 9 Oct or morning of 10 Oct; (b) Viaux urgently needed several hundred gas grenades (FO type that paralyzes.) [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he had wired [REDACTED] for gas grenades.

6 OCTOBER
[REDACTED]

Hqs advised the Station that the above represented a situation we feared most, a minicoup with scant chance of success. Requested Station use whatever channel available, including [REDACTED] to persuade Viaux to hold his action in abeyance while offering him full support for move at proper time.

6 OCTOBER
SABO [REDACTED]

Station asked Hqs to repeat authorization to use [REDACTED] to persuade Viaux to hold his action in abeyance and to offer him USG support for more serious move at proper time. Station convinced that any move by Viaux to be minicoup at best.

7 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

Station unaware what prompted [REDACTED] to approach [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] will see General Valenzuela on 7 Oct and will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate move by Viaux. COS will also ask [REDACTED] to dissuade Viaux without promising Viaux USG support for any later move.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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9 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
COS/[REDACTED] - COS met with [REDACTED] on
9 Oct who said he talked with Viaux last night. [REDACTED]
said Viaux unable to move at this time. Not ready. Has
no forces.

9 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

COS/[REDACTED] - COS met with [REDACTED] and
had a long talk. In response to COS question whether provision
arms for Viaux might be helpful, [REDACTED] replied: to
arm whom? [REDACTED] convinced Viaux lacks sizeable
following. Said Army with Air Force help could crush any
Viaux attempt.

10 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - During early morning hours 10 Oct
[REDACTED] came directly and unannounced to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] said they had reviewed earlier talk

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and wanted to make clarifications regarding their position and needs; arms drop is needed for Santiago area and would be used by commando or shock units. Discussed how arms would be transported from DZ and arrangements at DZ to guide aircraft. Said Viaux also needs VHF commo gear and life and disability insurance for Army officers behind him. Asked for 5 blank policies up to \$50,000 US currency and 20 other policies up to \$25,000. Also stressed need for riot control and mob dispersal weapons. Said General Schneider is principal stumbling block. Said Viaux will need extensive USG aid in form of food and medicine after coup. Also said no foreigners should be there when activities start and [REDACTED] would have to bug out. [REDACTED] promised to pass the proposed DZ and radio frequencies [REDACTED]

10 OCTOBER
[REDACTED]

Station was given following guidance re Viaux: (a) Encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning; (b) Gain some influence over his actions; (c) To suspend any actual decision, insofar as we can influence him, to stage a coup until we can assess its chances for success. Questioned why arms drop is only way of establishing [REDACTED] bona fides and why money would not work [REDACTED]

Asked Station to try influence Viaux, find out what forces he controls and finance him as conditions warrant. Believe air drop ill-considered.

11 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] / VIAUX / [REDACTED] - Station advised it was not possible to pass Hqs instructions to [REDACTED] prior his [REDACTED] meeting with [REDACTED] Viaux said drop had to be made no later than [REDACTED] Oct. [REDACTED] made no commitment or counter offer; unaware of Hqs instructions. Viaux also asked for life and [REDACTED]

SECRET

physical disability policies immediately [REDACTED]

12 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] /VIAUX/ [REDACTED] departed Santiago
11 Oct which was day of several meetings between
and Viaux group [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Important points of
meetings were: Viaux dropped his ultimatum conditions,
and said he needed more than any other thing "paralyzing
gas" for riot control. Claimed he receiving some
material help from [REDACTED]

13 OCTOBER
SAGO [REDACTED]

Station requested firm guidance from Hqs on what
objectives to pursue in further dealings with Viaux.

13 OCTOBER
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Debriefing of [REDACTED] at Hqs
indicates Viaux [REDACTED] be contacted soonest and informed:
(1) Sponsors regret technical factors preclude air drop
and "paralyzing gas". (2) In lieu of above hardware, can
promise financing if Viaux can police up what he needs
himself. (3) Sponsors will pledge up to \$250,000 US,
separate and distinct from sub-para 2 financing, for
"insurance purposes". Message also provided guidance for
further dealings with Viaux group.

[REDACTED]
SECRET [REDACTED]

14 OCTOBER

SAGO

SAGO

[REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] on morning 14 Oct. Expressed pleasure that recontact was made and welcomed [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that Viaux group will meet night 14 Oct to decide proper time to move on 17 Oct. First step is to kidnap Generals Schneider [REDACTED] Claimed that Viaux commands 150 trained and armed men who will serve as shock troops. Provided other details on Viaux following. In return, [REDACTED] said his sponsors pledged \$250,000 in lieu of written insurance policies. Also said Viaux group probably penetrated by PCCh and that [REDACTED] should be closely watched. Sponsors could not furnish arms or paralyzing gas due to time and technical factors. [REDACTED] Viaux [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] made strong plea for a minimum of 6 gas grenades which, he stated, were needed for Schneider/ [REDACTED] kidnap operation. [REDACTED] commented that [REDACTED] mistaken if he believed [REDACTED] had already supplied some arms [REDACTED] Admitted Viaux [REDACTED] in touch with [REDACTED] but that only assistance offered by [REDACTED] were 6 22 Cal. pistols which insufficient for group's needs.

16 OCTOBER

SAGO

[REDACTED] had 2 more meetings with Viaux group. [REDACTED] Oct meeting of Viaux group (See [REDACTED] postponed because unnamed [REDACTED] could not attend. Also: [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that Viaux accepted insurance pledge in lieu of policies. Viaux [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Viaux asked for [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]. If provided, [REDACTED] would join Viaux. [REDACTED] instructed tell [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] not interested in money, only in action and would join if coup seemed have good chance for success.) [REDACTED] asked for sponsor's opinion of plan import five Puerto Ricans to kidnap Schneider [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said such move dangerous.

16 OCTOBER
HQS

[REDACTED] policy and objectives reviewed at high level USG 15 Oct. Firm and continuing policy Allende be overthrown by coup. Group also determined that coup attempt carried out by Viaux alone would fail and counter-productive to greater interests of [REDACTED]. Instructed Station get message to Viaux repeating above and advising him to preserve his assets for proper time at which he will have our support. Also to advise Viaux to join forces with other coup planners so they act in concert.

16 OCTOBER
SAGO

[REDACTED] Again Viaux group postponed making decision on if and when move. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] advice on practicality of minicoup in which 25-30 men would hit and run to [REDACTED] and Viaux go into asylum. [REDACTED] asked for [REDACTED] to buy important unnamed general. In response to [REDACTED] query as to General iden, [REDACTED] said he would approach and if General agreed, would identify.

17 OCTOBER
SAGO

[REDACTED] read message provided in [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. No reaction since Viaux group met 16 Oct and decided to move 21 or 22 Oct. [REDACTED] to have final meeting with [REDACTED] 18 Oct to turn over gas grenades and masks. (After exchange of SAGO [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], it decided give grenades and masks to [REDACTED] group instead of Viaux).

19 OCTOBER
SAGO

[REDACTED] said coup now set for 22 Oct and that abduction of Gen. Schneider is first link in chain of events. Viaux [REDACTED] to leave for Valparaiso [REDACTED] so cannot be linked to coup.

NO FURTHER CONTACT BETWEEN [REDACTED] /COS and
VIAUX GROUP.

28 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Scenario Passed to General Viaux

1. Background: On 28 October 1970 [REDACTED] informed his contact, [REDACTED], that he could no longer continue to meet the General Viaux group without meeting some of their requests for support. [REDACTED]

At the same time [REDACTED] was given a typed scenario for him to memorize and then to use to cover his failure to produce an airdrop.

2. [REDACTED]

3. The Station-prepared scenario, as reconstructed from memory, follows: Tell General Viaux that we are understanding of his needs and support his intentions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] you have been unable to arrange the airdrop because of technical and security problems. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

SECRET

DENIED IN TOTO

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